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Recent catastrophic natural disasters, such as the
Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, and the Haitian
earthquake of 2010, have received more interna-
tional attention than previous disasters, yet our
rapidly evolving understanding regarding their
relevance to economic development and growth is
still in its infancy. Much research in the social sci-
ences, and even more in the natural sciences, has
been devoted to increasing our ability to predict
disasters and prepare for them. Interestingly,
however, the economic research on natural disas-
ters and their consequences is fairly limited. We
summarize here the state of this literature and
point to questions that we believe need further
probing.
Sen (1981), in his seminal economic history of
famines, famously observed that starvation is the
characteristic of some people not having enough
food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there being
not enough food to eat. In Sen’s work, the central
emphasis is that the costs associated with what we
define as natural disasters are largely determined by
economic and social forces rather than predeter-
mined by natural processes. Sen’s observation sug-
gests that economics is important not only in under-
standing what happens after a disaster occurs, but
rather that the very occurrence of disasters is an eco-
nomic event.
A recent pertinent example is the devastation that
recent earthquakes wrought in Haiti and Chile. The
January 2010 earthquake that struck Haiti’s densely
populated capital, Port-au-Prince, caused significant
loss of human life (between 200,000 and 250,000 fa-
talities),the displacement of more than a million and
severe damage to the country’s economic infrastruc-
ture (estimated over 100 percent of the country’s
GDP) – see Cavallo, Powell and Becerra (2010). In
contrast, the February 2010 earthquake in Chile
which was physically stronger and also struck a
densely populated area caused many fewer fatalities
(less than 500 people killed according to most recent
official estimates). And although direct economic
damages are expected to be substantial due to the
amount of wealth exposed, they are expected to be
far less than Haiti’s in relation to the size of the
economy.1 Clearly, these dissimilar outcomes origi-
nated from different policies, institutional arrange-
ments and economic conditions.
Pelling et al. (2002) and ECLAC (2003) introduce a
typology of disaster impacts that we adopt here.
They distinguish between direct and indirect dam-
ages. Direct damages are the damage to fixed assets
and capital (including inventories), damages to raw
materials and extractable natural resources, and of
course mortality and morbidity that are a direct con-
sequence of the natural phenomenon. Indirect dam-
ages refer to the economic activity, in particular the
production of goods and services, that will not take
place following the disaster and because of it.These
indirect damages may be caused by the direct dam-
ages to physical infrastructure, or because recon-
struction pulls resources away from production.
These indirect damages also include the additional
costs that are incurred because of the need to use
alternative and potentially inferior means of produc-
tion and/or distribution for the provision of normal
goods and services. At the household level, these
indirect costs also include the loss of income result-
ing from the non-provision of goods and services or
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2010).from the destruction of previously used means of
production. These costs can be accounted for in the
aggregate by examining the overall performance of
the economy,as measured through the most relevant
macroeconomic variables. They can also be further
divided, following the standard distinction in macro-
economics, between the short run (up to several
years) and the long run (at least five years but some-
times also measured in decades).We use this distinc-
tion in the discussion that follows.
The second section begins with a brief review of the
main data sources used in this largely empirical liter-
ature.The third section discusses the determinants of
the direct effects, while the fourth section examines
the indirect effects.The fifth section focuses on poli-
cy,while the sixth section describes several case stud-
ies of specific disasters and the insights gained from
them. The final section 7 summarizes and points to
several significant gaps in this literature.
Data on disasters
Almost all the empirical work we survey here relies
on the publicly available Emergency Events
Database (EM-DAT) maintained by the Center for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)
at the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium
(http://emdat-be/). The database is compiled from
various sources, including UN agencies, non-govern-
mental organizations, insurance companies, research
institutions and press agencies.
EM-DAT defines a disaster as a natural situation or
event which overwhelms local capacity and/or neces-
sitates a request for external assistance. For a disas-
ter to be entered into the EM-DAT database,at least
one of the following criteria must be met: (a) ten or
more people are reported killed; (b) 100 people are
reported affected; (c) a state of emergency is
declared; or (d) a call for international assistance is
issued. Disasters can be hydro-meteorological
including floods, wave surges, storms, droughts, land-
slides and avalanches; geophysical including earth-
quakes,tsunamis and volcanic eruptions;and biolog-
ical covering epidemics and insect infestations (these
are much more infrequent in this database).
The data report the number of people killed, the
number of people affected and the dollar amount
of direct damages in each disaster. The amount of
material damage reported in the database consists
only of direct damages (e.g. damage to infrastruc-
ture, crops and housing).An alternative but similar
source that is less extensive,and only parts of which
are publicly available, is the Munich Re dataset at
http://mrnathan.munichre.com/. A similar data col-
lection effort with similar coverage but more limit-
ed access is maintained by another reinsurer, Swiss
Re.For an analytical review of selected data sets on
natural disasters, see Tschoegl et al. (2006).
A few papers use other data sources. Most notable
are those that aim to estimate the impact of
storms/hurricanes. These papers use data on storm
intensity, typically measured by wind speed or storm
radius that are taken from the US National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the
Pielke et al. (2008) database.
Before reviewing the evidence on the impacts of nat-
ural disasters, it is useful to describe the stylized
facts. First, natural disasters, as defined in the EM-
DAT database, are fairly common events and their
reported incidence has been growing over time.
Figure 1 plots the average number of natural events
(including hydro-meteorological and geophysical
events) per country over the span of the last four
decades. The figure shows that the incidence of dis-
asters has been growing over time everywhere in the
world. For example, in the Asia-Pacific region which
is the region with the most events, the incidence has
grown from an average of 11 events per country in
the 1970s to over 28 events in the 2000s.2 In other
regions, while the increase is less dramatic, the trend
is similar. However, these patterns appear to be dri-
ven to some extent by improved recording of milder
events,rather than by an increase in the frequency of
occurrence. Furthermore, truly large events – i.e.
conceivably more catastrophic – are rarer. Both of
these facts are shown in Figure 2, where the sample
is restricted to large events only, and where ‘large’ is
defined in relation to the world mean of direct dam-
age caused by natural events.3
As is evident from the figure,there is no time trend
for the subset of large events in any region.
Moreover, the frequency of occurrence of ‘large’
disasters is significantly smaller than for all events.
For example, while there are more than 28 events
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per country on average in the Asia-Pacific region
in the 2000s, the frequency of occurrence of large
events is only 0.5 episodes per country. This sug-
gests that the threshold for what constitutes a dis-
aster (and hence gets recorded in the dataset) is
quite low.
The overwhelming majority of people affected and
killed by natural disasters reside in developing
countries, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.
Figures 3 and 4 show that 96 percent of the people
killed and 99 percent of the people affected by
natural disasters over the period 1970–2008 were
in the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America and the
Caribbean, or Africa, whereas the combined pop-
ulation share of these three regions is approxi-
mately 75 percent of the world population. Since
the 1970s, and excluding the
most recent 2009–2010 events,
almost three million people
were reportedly killed by nat-
ural disasters in the three most
vulnerable regions.
In summary, natural events are
frequent although ‘large’ events
– the ones that would typically
be considered catastrophic – are
rarer.The direct costs associated
with these events are huge, and
developing countries bear the
lion’s share of the burden, in
terms of both casualties and
direct economic damages.
Determinants of initial disaster costs
A spate of papers in the last several years has
attempted to understand the determinants of the ini-
tial direct costs of disasters. When evaluating the
determinants of disasters, most papers estimate a
model of the form:
. (1)
where DISit is a measure of direct damages of a dis-
aster in country i and time t; using measures of pri-
mary initial damage such as mortality, morbidity or
capital losses. Xit is a vector of control variables of
interest with each paper distinguishing different
independent variables; typically Xit will include a
measure of the disaster magni-
tude (i.e. Richter scale for earth-
quakes or wind speed for hurri-
canes) and variables that cap-
ture the ‘vulnerability’ of the
country to disasters (i.e. the con-
ditions which increase the sus-
ceptibility of a country to the
impact of natural hazards).
Instead of estimating these pan-
els, several papers aggregate the
data across time and estimate
cross sections of country obser-
vations.
One of the conditions that may
increase a country’s susceptibili-
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it it it DIS   =+ + Xters is its level of economic development. Kahn
(2005) estimates a version of equation (1) and con-
cludes that while richer countries do not experience
fewer or less severe natural disasters,their death toll
is substantially lower. In 1990, a poor country (per
capita GDP < 2000 US dollars) typically experi-
enced 9.4 deaths per million people per year, while
a richer country (per capita GDP > 14,000 US dol-
lars) would have had only 1.8 deaths.This difference
is most likely due to the greater amount of resources
spent on prevention efforts and legal enforcement
of mitigation rules (e.g. building codes). In particu-
lar, some of the policy interventions likely to ame-
liorate disaster impact, including land-use regula-
tions, building codes and engineering interventions,
are rare in less developed coun-
tries (see, for example, Freeman
et al. 2003).
Notwithstanding this, Kellen-
berg and Mobarak (2008) sug-
gest a more nuanced, nonlinear
relationship between economic
development and vulnerability
to natural disasters, with risk ini-
tially increasing with higher
incomes as a result of changing
behaviors, such as residents
locating to more desirable but
more dangerous sites near coasts
and floodplains. Sadowski and
Sutter (2005) provide some con-
firmation for this view by exam-
ining hurricanes in the United
States and the ways in which better preparedness
leads to higher residential coastal concentrations
(where the risk from hurricane-associated wave
surges is actually higher).
Other papers focus on the political and institutional
factors that affect disaster impact.A consistent find-
ing of several studies (i.e. Kahn 2005; Skidmore and
Toya 2007; Plümper and Neumayer 2009; Raschky
2008) is that better institutions – understood, for
instance, as more stable democratic regimes or
greater security of property rights – reduce disaster
impact.Anbarci et al. (2005) elaborate on the politi-
cal economy of disaster prevention. They conclude
that inequality is important as a determinant of pre-
vention efforts: more unequal
societies tend to have fewer
resources spent on prevention,
as they are unable to resolve the
collective action problem of
implementing preventive and
mitigating measures. In a similar
vein, Besley and Burgess (2002)
observe that flood impacts in
India are negatively correlated
with newspaper distribution;
they attribute this effect to the
fact that when circulation is
higher, politicians are more
accountable and the government
is more active in both preventing
and mitigating the impacts of
disasters. Eisensee and Ström-
berg (2007) reach similar conclu-
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sions regarding the response of US disaster aid to
media reports.
Healy and Malhotra (2009) add to this literature by
identifying the lack of political accountability for
elected public officials in the United States as an
explanation for inefficient allocation decisions.
Voters reward candidates for post-disaster aid but
not for well-funded prevention.Thus, the public sec-
tor under-invests in preventing these catastrophic
events, but readily spends on post-disaster recon-
struction and aid.
In summary,thinking of natural disasters as econom-
ic phenomena and not as purely exogenous events
has led researchers to seek to explain the fundamen-
tal structural determinants of the direct damages
incurred from disasters.While the damage caused by
disasters is naturally related to the physical intensity
of the event, the literature has identified a series of
economic, social, and political characteristics that
also affect vulnerability. A by-product of this analy-
sis, of course, is that these characteristics are there-
fore potentially amenable to policy action.
Cross-country studies of indirect impacts
A disaster’s initial impact causes mortality, morbidi-
ty and loss of physical infrastructure (residential
housing, roads, telecommunication and electricity
networks as well as other infrastructure). These ini-
tial impacts are followed by consequent impacts on
the economy (in terms of income, employment, sec-
toral composition of production, inflation, etc.).
Macroeconomics generally distinguishes between
the short run (usually up to three years) and the long
run (anything beyond five years is typically consid-
ered the long run). In what follows we summarize
the literature on the indirect economic effects of nat-
ural disasters.
When evaluating the determinants of these conse-
quent impacts of disasters in a regression frame-
work, most recent papers estimate a model of the
form:
. (2)
where  Yit is the measured consequent impact of
interest (e.g. per capita GDP). DISit is a measure of
the disaster’s immediate impact on country i at
time t; it is sometimes a binary indicator of disaster
occurrence and sometimes a measure of the disaster
magnitude – either using physical criteria such as
wind-speed or earthquake magnitude or using mea-
sures of primary initial damage such as mortality,
morbidity or capital losses. Xit is a vector of control
variables that potentially affect Yit.
In order to facilitate investigations into the interac-
tion of the initial disaster impact with country-spe-
cific conditions, equations such as:
(3)
are used,where the Vit variables are the hypothesized
interactions of disaster impact with macroeconomic,
institutional or even demographic or geographic
characteristics.In these specifications,the coefficients
of interest are typically   and the vector  .
Noy (2009) estimates a version of equation (3) and
finds that natural disasters have an adverse short-
run impact on output dynamics. In addition he
describes some of the structural and institutional
details that make this negative effect worse.He con-
cludes that countries with a higher literacy rate,bet-
ter institutions, higher per capita income, higher
degree of openness to trade, higher levels of gov-
ernment spending, more foreign exchange reserves,
and higher levels of domestic credit but with less
open capital accounts are better able to withstand
the initial disaster shock and prevent further
spillovers.Subsequently,Raddatz (2009) extends the
investigation to the impact of various types of nat-
ural disasters on countries in different income
groups. He concludes that smaller and poorer states
are more vulnerable, especially to climatic events,
and that most of the output cost of climatic events
occurs during the year of the disaster. His evidence
also suggests that, historically, aid flows have done
little to attenuate the output consequences of cli-
matic disasters. More recent work adds more detail
by differentiating between different types of events
and different economic sectors (e.g. Hochrainer
2009; Loayza et al. 2009).
Several papers pursue similar investigations, but
instead of relying on cross-country panels, they rely
on more detailed panels at the firm, county, region,
or the state level. Strobl (2008) uses differences in
hurricane impact on coastal counties in the United
States; Noy and Vu (2009) use provincial disaster
data from Vietnam; and Leiter et al. (2009) uses
European firm-level data.
it it it it YD I S    =+ + + X
it it it it it it it YD I S D I S     =+ + +  ++ XV VIn summary, the emerging consensus in the litera-
ture is that natural disasters have, on average, a
negative impact on short-term economic growth.
Yet, the channels that are responsible for this eco-
nomic slowdown have not been described method-
ically at all.
In investigations into the long-term impact of natur-
al disasters, Skidmore and Toya (2002), and Noy and
Nualsri (2007) reach diametrically opposite conclu-
sions, with the former identifying expansionary and
the latter contractionary disaster effects. More
recently, Jaramillo (2009) finds qualified support for
the Noy and Nualsri (2007) conclusion. Skidmore
and Toya (2002) explain their somewhat counterin-
tuitive finding by suggesting that disasters may be
speeding up the Schumpeterian ‘creative destruc-
tion’ process that is at the heart of the development
of market economies.Cuaresma et al. (2008) attempt
to investigate this creative destruction hypothesis
empirically by closely examining the evolution of
R&D from foreign origin and how it is affected by
catastrophic risk. They conclude that the creative
destruction dynamic most likely only occurs in coun-
tries with high per capita income. For developing
countries, disaster occurrence is associated with less
knowledge spillover and a reduction in the amount
of new technology being introduced. Hallegatte and
Dumas (2009) critically examine the creative
destruction hypothesis using a calibrated endoge-
nous growth model.They conclude that disasters are
never positive economic events and find that large
disasters that overwhelm local reconstruction capac-
ity may actually lead to poverty traps.
When compared to the short-run research, the litera-
ture on the long-run effects of natural disasters is scant
and its results inconclusive. Cavallo, Galiani, Noy and
Pantano (2010) provide the most recent attempt to
bridge that gap.They implement a new methodologi-
cal approach based on a comparative event study
approach. The idea is to construct an appropriate
counterfactual – i.e.what would have happened to the
path of gross domestic product (GDP) of the affected
country in the absence of a natural disaster and to
assess the disaster’s impact by comparing the counter-
factual to the actual path observed. The paper con-
cludes that unless a natural disaster triggers a radical
institutional change; it is unlikely to affect economic
growth in the long run.
Almost all existing research focuses on domestic
production (GDP) or on incomes; other impacts
of disasters have been under-investigated.
Rodriguez-Oreggia  et al. (2009) and Mechler
(2009) innovate by examining poverty and human
development (the World Bank’s Human Develop-
ment Index, HDI) and consumption, respectively,
instead of the standard growth variables.The first
paper shows a significant increase in poverty and
a decline in the HDI in disaster-affected muni-
cipalities in Mexico; poverty increases by
1.5–3.6 percentage points. The second paper finds
a small decrease in household consumption for
low-income countries hit by disasters.
The fiscal impact of natural disasters has also been
under-investigated.On the expenditure side,publicly
financed reconstruction costs may be very different
than the original magnitude of destruction of older
capital that occurred (Fengler et al. 2008). On the
revenue side of the fiscal ledger, the impact of disas-
ters on tax and other public revenue sources has also
seldom been quantitatively examined. Using panel
VAR methodology,Noy and Nualsri (2008) estimate
the fiscal dynamics likely in an ‘average’ disaster;
however, they acknowledge that the impacts of dis-
asters on revenue and spending depend on the coun-
try-specific macroeconomic dynamics occurring fol-
lowing the disaster shock, the unique structure of
revenue sources (income taxes, consumption taxes,
custom dues, etc.), and large expenditures.4
Borensztein et al. (2009) utilize data from Belize to
estimate in a calibrated model the likely fiscal insur-
ance needs of a government. Barnichon (2008) cal-
culates the optimal amount of international reserves
for a country facing external disaster shocks using a
similar methodology.5 Yang (2008) and Bluedorn
(2005) investigate the evolution of capital flows fol-
lowing disasters, and both conclude that disasters
generate some inflows (mostly international aid but
also other types of flows like remittances).
Case studies of disaster impacts
Several research projects have examined the eco-
nomic impact of specific disaster events. Examples
are the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan (Horwich
2000), the 1999 earthquake in Turkey (Selcuk and
Yeldan 2001) and hurricane Katrina in 2005
(Hallegatte 2008; Vigdor 2008). Most of these are
descriptive, though some also construct calibrated
models that simulate the dynamics of the economy
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after it is hit by the disaster and are therefore able
to tentatively evaluate various policy responses.
More recently, Cavallo, Powell and Becerra (2010)
estimate Haiti’s economic damage to fixed assets,
extractable natural resources and raw materials in
the aftermath of the earthquake that struck the
Caribbean country on 12 January 2010 – by far the
most catastrophic natural disaster in modern
records in terms of fatalities (relative to the coun-
try’s population).
These analyses were typically written not very
long after the event considered. In contrast,
Coffman and Noy (2009) investigate the long-term
impact of a 1992 hurricane on the economy of a
Hawaiian island. In this case, the long horizon
available,the unexpectedness of the event,and the
existence of an ideal control group subjected to
almost identical conditions but not the hurricane
itself, enables them to argue that in spite of mas-
sive transfers, it took nearly seven years for the
island’s economy to return to its pre-hurricane per
capita income level.The hurricane also resulted in
an out-migration of residents from which the
island’s population has not fully recovered. The
island permanently ‘lost’ about 15 percent of its
population as a result of the hurricane, even
though very few deaths were associated with the
storm.
Policies and disasters
Perrow (2007), in a recent book on reducing cata-
strophic vulnerabilities in the United States, argues
that public policy should focus on the need to
‘shrink’ the targets: lower population concentration
in vulnerable (especially coastal) areas, and lower
concentration of utilities and other infrastructure in
disaster-prone locations. This advice stems from the
awareness that more ex-post assistance to damaged
communities generates a ‘Samaritan’s dilemma’, i.e.
an increase in risk-taking and a reluctance to pur-
chase insurance when taking into account the help
that is likely to be provided should a disaster strike.6
However, apart from these ex-ante ‘shrink-the-tar-
get’ policies, many other ex-ante and ex-post policies
that can alleviate or worsen the economic impact of
disasters will necessarily be weighed before and after
any large event.
Besides policies that can reduce initial disaster dam-
age, policies that can reduce the longer-term eco-
nomic damage that disasters can wreak should also
be contemplated. We have already observed that
large disasters typically lead to reduced production
and incomes, even if the exact distribution of these
effects and their causes are not yet clear. Yet, as
Freeman et al. (2003) observe,some of the other like-
ly macroeconomic impacts of disasters may be a
deteriorating trade balance, downward pressure on
the exchange rate, and upward pressure on prices.
How to deal with these likely dynamics is a policy
question that also needs to be asked.
Ex-ante insurance vs. ex-post disaster financing
Kunreuther and Pauly (2009) survey some of the
problems associated with ex-ante insurance cover-
age for large natural events:uncertainty with regard
to the magnitude of potential loses, highly correlat-
ed risk among the insured, moral hazard that leads
to excessive risk taking by the insured, and an
adverse selection of insured parties caused by
imperfect information.Their work also distinguishes
between unknown disasters (those for which the
likelihood and the distribution of probable magni-
tudes are at least partially known) and the unknow-
able (those for which no information is available).
Even though natural disasters are typically not
unknowable, these problems still clearly lead to
under-insurance. In all recent disasters, even in ones
that happened in heavily insured countries like the
United States, only a relatively small portion of
actual damages was insured. For example, hurricane
Katrina led to insurance claims totaling 46.3 billion
US dollars;while the estimated damage of the storm
was 158.2 billion US dollars.7
Insurance for the public sector,in order to secure the
availability of reconstruction expenditures, is also an
important policy question.There is broad consensus
on the need to design fiscal management policies to
resist the stress caused by the occurrence of disas-
ters. Freeman et al. (2003) consider ways to create
the necessary fiscal space to deal with catastrophic
risk. Among various alternatives, they advocate
treating natural disasters as a contingent liability for
the national government (although they are skepti-
cal about this suggestion’s practical feasibility, par-
6 This is similar to the moral hazard problem common in insurance
markets. Raschky and Weck-Hannemann (2007) define it as ‘chari-
ty hazard’.
7 Katrina insurance claim data are from Kunreuther and Pauly
(2009), while the figure for total damages is taken from EM-DAT.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates 70 to 130 billion US
dollars as direct damages (excluding the cost of clean-up and
repairs) for hurricanes Katrina and Rita.ticularly in low-income countries). A more substan-
tive initiative would be to implement an annual bud-
getary allocation to provide for natural disaster
expenditure when needed. Mexico’s FONDEN
(Fondo Nacional de Desastres Naturales) provides
this kind of fiscal provisioning against the risk of nat-
ural disasters. But these measures, while prudent,
amount to forms of self-insurance, which may be
very costly in the case of an economy with substan-
tial credit constraints.
Borensztein et al. (2009) argue that, in the case of
developing countries exposed to large natural disas-
ters, insurance – or debt contracts with insurance-
like features – provides an attractive alternative to
self-insurance. For example, they examine the vul-
nerability of Belize’s public finance to the occur-
rence of hurricanes and the potential impact of
insurance instruments in reducing that vulnerability.
Through numerical simulations they show that cata-
strophic risk insurance significantly improves
Belize’s debt sustainability.
Implementing disaster insurance in developing
countries, however, faces three types of obstacles:
paucity of markets, political resistance and inade-
quate institutional framework. For a number of
reasons, markets have traditionally been in-
sufficiently developed or simply nonexistent
(more on this below). More recently, however,
advances such as the development of parametric
insurance policies have expanded the availability
of coverage for countries and households
(Cárdenas 2008).8
Political reluctance to engage in insurance purchase
derives from the fact that there is little short-run
benefit to be gained from entering into insurance
contracts.Insurance involves costs today and a possi-
ble payoff in the undetermined future,when the gov-
ernment may have already changed hands. In addi-
tion to these incentive problems,disasters are widely
considered as ‘acts of God’ (or natural phenomena),
and politicians are not often blamed for their occur-
rence. Politicians and policy-makers therefore face
very weak incentives for adopting relatively complex
measures, such as purchasing market insurance, to
offset some of the costs. Healy and Malhotra (2009)
present evidence to support these conjectures even
for the transparent and fairly stable political system
of the United States. However, since governments
are typically held accountable for their response to
disasters, they have strong incentives to massively
invest in ex-post assistance.
Of the three obstacles that deter the development
of a catastrophic risk insurance market, the one
related to market unavailability has been the most
studied.The consensus is that governments in coun-
tries that are vulnerable to natural disasters appear
to have only a limited set of options available to
insure public finances against those risks, although
progress is slowly being made.Hofman and Brukoff
(2006), Cárdenas (2008), Andersen (2007), and
Miller and Keipi (2005) survey some recent initia-
tives in this regard. The risk profile of catastrophe
insurance claims differs from that of other insur-
ance products. A company providing car insurance
can easily diversify if it has many clients, since the
volume of claims would then be highly predictable.
In contrast, natural disasters are low-probability
events that can cause extremely large losses when
they occur and are thus not easily diversifiable in
the same way as car insurance. This low level of
diversification increases the cost of insurance. Its
price is very volatile and fluctuates sharply every
time there is a major catastrophic event that
depletes reserves. Primary insurers need to transfer
a considerable share of their catastrophe exposure
to large reinsurers, and this increased reliance on
reinsurers increases the cost of primary insurance,
reducing its attractiveness and scope.
Private capital markets offer some complementary
alternatives that may increase the availability of
financing options as they continue to develop. The
first capital market instrument linked to catastrophe
risk (‘cat bonds’) was introduced in 1994 as a means
for reinsurers to transfer some of their own risks to
capital markets.Since then,their success has prompt-
ed governments and international institutions to
explore their use as a mean of shielding government
budgets from the impact of natural disasters
(Andersen 2007). A catastrophe bond is a tradable
instrument that facilitates the transfer of the risk of
a catastrophic event to capital markets. In May 2006
and again in October 2009,the Mexican government
obtained earthquake and hurricane insurance by
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means of cat bonds and a direct purchase of cover-
age from international reinsurers.9
While these are encouraging developments, the pri-
vate catastrophic risk market is still in its infancy.
And even if the supply side of risk financing instru-
ments becomes fully developed,important questions
remain unanswered. For example: what is the opti-
mal level of insurance that countries should pur-
chase given the cost of insurance, the menu of alter-
native financing options (self-insurance,ex-post debt
accumulation, foreign aid, etc.), and country charac-
teristics (access to external credit, macroeconomic
environment, institutional quality, etc.)? What is the
appropriate institutional set-up that ensures the
proper functioning of insurance schemes while min-
imizing moral hazard and adverse selection? What is
the appropriate role of the government vis-à-vis the
private sector in catastrophe insurance markets?
These are still open questions that warrant further
analysis.
Monetary and exchange rate policy
There has been very little research on the monetary
aspects of disaster dynamics.As far as we are aware,
even elementary questions such as, for example, the
inflationary impact of a large disaster and the aid
surge in its aftermath,have not been carefully exam-
ined.Open-economy questions,such as the impact of
disasters on exchange rates (real or nominal) or the
terms of trade have also not been examined empiri-
cally or analytically.
Keen and Pakko (2007) construct a dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium model calibrated for
the US economy and the impact of Katrina, and
evaluate the optimal response of monetary policy
to a Katrina-like shock. They find, intriguingly,
given public discussion and market perceptions at
the time, that optimal monetary policy design
should involve raising interest rates following a
large disaster. They show that this result holds for
both a Taylor-rule setting of interest rates, for opti-
mal policy setting that replicates the efficient mar-
kets solution, and when the model includes nomi-
nal rigidities in both prices and wages. Keen and
Pakko (2007) argue that this result arises because
the anti-inflationary justification for the contrac-
tionary policy will trump any desire to temporarily
expand output.
In possibly the only empirical paper on exchange
rates and disasters, Ramcharan (2007) examines
exchange rate policy and its affect on the damage
inflicted by disasters. He finds consistent evidence
that flexible exchange rate regimes provide a cush-
ion that ameliorates the disaster’s negative impact
on growth.
Conclusions and remaining questions
The economics of natural disasters are important.In
order to facilitate further necessary research on this
topic, we summarized the state of this literature.We
believe that large gaps in this literature remain.The
EM-DAT, the only internationally comparable and
available data on disasters, collects only limited
information on conceivably too many events.10 A
more detailed accounting of the physical destruc-
tion wrought by large disasters and their human toll
may prove to be very useful. We would especially
like to be able to distinguish among residential dam-
age, crop devastation, infrastructure damage and
destruction of manufacturing facilities in order to
better address many of the questions that remain
unanswered.
While the literature we reviewed examines the
short- and long-run effects of disasters and provides
detailed, if inconclusive, accounting of post-disaster
dynamics, it does not provide any description of the
channels through which disasters cause these effects.
An understanding of the channels of causality, in
both the short and the long run, will surely enable
more informed ex-post policymaking and possibly
better ex-ante preparation and mitigation.
We have presented some provisional evidence that
the extent of adverse impact is related to the ability
to mobilize significant funding for reconstruction.
We have also shown that poorer countries are likely
to suffer more from future disasters, but these coun-
tries are also unlikely to be able to adopt the
counter-cyclical fiscal policies that can pay for recon-
struction. This constraint will make disasters’
9 The cat bond issued in 2006 (for a total of 150 million US dollars
in coverage) was the first to cover disaster risk in Latin America.
The Mexican government has followed this initiative and intro-
duced a new cat bond issue in October 2009 sponsored by
FONDEN. This USD 290 million three year cat bond provides
cover for earthquakes on the Pacific coast (140 million US dollars),
Pacific hurricanes (100 million US dollars) and Atlantic hurricanes
(50 million US dollars). Coverage will last for three years.
10 Since the threshold used to determine what constitutes a disaster
is quite lenient, the dataset contains limited information on a large
variety of events.adverse consequences more severe in poorer devel-
oping countries. A better-targeted reconstruction
that is informed by the identified channels of trans-
mission can potentially alleviate some of these
resource constraints.
A further significant lacuna in the current state of our
knowledge is the absence of any agreement regard-
ing the long-run effects of these disasters. Whether
these disagreements have any substantial real rele-
vance to policy decisions can only be assessed when
the channels of transmission and propagation for
these effects become more evident.
We have not reviewed the micro-development liter-
ature that has been examining the ways in which
households (typically rural households) deal with
sudden disaster events (e.g. Townsend 1994; Udry
1994; Dercon 2004).Whether these shed light on the
channels of transmission is a possibility that needs to
be further explored. Nor have we reviewed the liter-
ature on aid allocations following disasters and their
impact. This small literature was recently surveyed
by Strömberg (2007) who also provides stylized facts
on who gives relief, how much is given and who
receives it.
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